In Sweeney v. Woodall, 1 the petitioner, a Negro, had escaped from imprisonment in Alabama and made his way to Ohio, where he was apprehended by Ohio officials pursuant to a request for rendition by the Governor of Alabama.
2
The Ohio executive ordered his return to Alabama, 3 whereupon Woodall applied to the Ohio courts for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that while confined in Alabama he had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fugitive offered to prove that his Alabama jailors had frequently beaten him with a nine pound strap with metal prongs, resulting in unconsciousness and permanent wounds; that he had been stripped to the waist and made to work all day in the broiling sun without a rest period; and that he had been forced to be a "gal-boy" or female for the homosexuals among the prisoners. Woodall contended that he would be treated even more inhumanely if returned. 4 Having exhausted his remedies in the courts of Ohio without relief, 5 Woodall renewed his petition in the federal courts. 6 The District Court dismissed the petition but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the ease for a hearing upon the merits. 7 The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that if the prisoner had not escaped he would have had to bring his action in Alabama;8 that by escaping to "another jurisdiction he should not be allowed to affect the authority of the Alabama
344 U.S. 86 (1952).
2. "A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be deliVered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." Article Four, section two, of the United States Constitution. The procedure to be followed has been set out by Congress in 18 U.S.C. §3281 (1948) . The papers required in a request for rendition must contain a demand for the fugitive, a copy of the indictment or an affidavit charging the fugitive with a crime, and authentication by the Governor or 8. "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. . ... " 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1948). courts to determine the validity of his imprisonment";9 that our federal system requires the prisoner to test the claimed unconstitutionality of his treatment by Alabama in the courts of that state ;LO and that in Alabama all parties may be heard and all pertinent testimony will be readily available." Woodall therefore must return to the cruel treatment he fears (assuming his allegations are true) in order to have his case heard upon its merits.
The problem of a fugitive's right to raise questions of cruel and unusual punishment, in habeas corpus proceedings, first arose in Johnson v. Dye, 12 a ease involving facts substantially similar to the Sweeney case. There the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the petitioner need not have exhausted his remedies in the courts of the asylum state in order to apply to the federal courts ;13 that cruel and unusual punishment by a state is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment ;14 and that an inquiry into the truth of such assertions is permissible in a habeas corpus petition while the fugitive is still in asylum. 14. The Supreme Court has not yet definitively ruled on the issue of whether cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) , the court went so far as to assume that infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by a state would violate the due process clause. Protection against such punishment would seem to be a part of the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" which Mr. justice Cardozo declared was the test in deciding which rights fall within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. until Sweeney v. Woodall 20 did the Supreme Court directly meet the issue and apparently adopt the latter view.
The scope of inquiry in habeas corpus cases dealing with interstate rendition has been strictly limited in the past and the courts generally have confined themselves to the following factors: (a) the identity of the fugitive ;21 (b) whether the prisoner is a fugitive from justice;22 and (c) whether the accused was in the demanding state at the time the alleged crime was committed. 23 If the fugitive were permitted to test the validity of his original incarceration this traditional scope of review would either be broadened or an exception raised to include allegations of cruel and unusual punishment. The Sweeney case decided in favor of the narrower approach by requiring the prisoner to test his claim in the courts of the demanding state.
The Sweeney case represents a reluctance on the part of the courts to enlarge the traditional scope of review on the grounds that the writ tests only the detention by the asylum state, Many reasons have been advanced for following the view of the Sweeney case in retaining the traditional scope of review in habeas corpus proceedings. But assuming that the allegations of cruel and unusual punishment are true, it seems clear that any reasons advanced for requiring a man to return to imprisonment, which is known to be barbaric and cruel and which will endanger his life, must be of the most convincing nature.
In support of its stand, the Supreme Court places a great deal of emphasis upon the relations between the federal and state governments, stating that, "considerations fundamental to our federal system require that the prisoner However, the "flexible nature" of the writ of habeas corpus will allow a waiver of this rule "when necessary to prevent an unjust and illegal deprivation of human liberty." 31 Viewing cruel and unusual punishment as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it can be fairly argued that requiring a man to return to such treatment in order to obtain relief would qualify him for this waiver. 32 If such a waiver were to be allowed the possibility of ill will between the respective sovereignties, which is the basis of many rules of comity, would be.no greater than when the constitutionality of any state action is passed upon in the federal courts. Moreover, the rare number of these cases leads to the conclusion that this danger is more apparent than real.
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A second argument in support of the Sweeney rule is that to permit the fugitive to test the validity of his original incarceration in the asylum state would place a premium on and encourage escaping to another jurisdiction, 34 for if Woodall had not escaped he would have had to exhaust his remedies in the Alabama courts before making an application to the federal courts sitting in Alabama. 35 As has elsewhere been pointed out, there is little validity to the argument.
3 6 Prisoners do not escape with the idea of being recaptured and resisting their return to prison, for in the event of recapture, the escapee would likely be subjected to an additional prison term. In addition, the fugitive bears the burden of proof as to the truth of his allegations.
3 7 Because of the reluctance of the courts to release an obviously guilty man, this proof must be of the most convincing nature. Thus, the difficulty in proving allegations of cruel and unusual punishment might itself be a healthy detterent if the escape argument has any validity.
Another reason advanced for the decision in the Sweeney case is that the demanding state can better and more readily defend against its claimed constitutional abuses in the courts of that state.
38 But, whenever a fugitive contests his rendition the demanding state assumes a certain burden to aid in overcoming the prisoner's allegations. It does not appear that this burden would be sufficiently increased, when allegations of cruel and unusual punishment are made, to warrant sending the prisoner back to the brutal treatment he alleges. Moreover, the relatively small number of these cases and the present status of modern communications and transportation greatly detract from this argument.
While the reasons in support of the Sweeney decision do not appear to be of the most convincing nature, the decision of the court nevertheless requires 
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the fugitive to return to the demanding state where it is assumed he will be able to obtain adequate relief. 39 The next question then is whether that relief is available. The Sweeney case indicates the prisoner may renew his suit for habeas corpus in the courts of the demanding state, and if relief is not accorded him there he may apply to the federal courts after exhausting his state remedies. 40 There are several factors that tend to make this remedy unattractive. While this time consuming litigation proceeds, the prisoner (assuming his allegations are true) may be subjected to more of the punishment which he alleges to be illegal, -while facing the added danger of retaliation. The possibility of speedy relief in the state courts would appear remote since punishment of extreme degrees is often provided by state statutes that have been upheld by the state courts as constitutional.
4 1 The retaliatory and racial prejudices that may exist in the demanding state courts could also prevent quick relief from the "cruel" punishment.
Should state courts fail to provide relief to the prisoner, the federal courts are severely limited as to the type of remedies available in a habeas corpus proceeding. While the usual remedy in habeas corpus is the release of the prisoner, 42 courts are hesitant to grant such relief because an obviously guilty man would be turned loose upon society. Injunctive remedies do not appear to be obtainable in the federal courts. The circuits are in conflict as to whether a federal prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus may be remanded to the federal prison with instructions for the protection of his Constitutional rights. 43 This reluctance to enjoin federal prison officials leaves only a slight possibility that such an order would issue from a federal court to a state official."
However, if no remedy other than release should prove to be available, the problem becomes one of balancing conflicting public interests: i.e., the right of a state to demand that a criminal pay for his crime, as opposed to the protection of those basic rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Just as it is felt that the gathering of illegal evidence is best discouraged by making it inadmissible and its use the cause for reversal, even though the accused is proven guilty by other evidence, 4 5 such releases might reasonably be justified as a means of protecting a prisoner's civil rights, and encouraging prison reform.
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Remedies other than habeas corpus might be available to the returned prisoner. A tort action against the responsible state officials is the principal form of legal redress, but this action affords no quick relief from the existing punishment and frequently state statutes prevent a prisoner from suing while imprisoned. 47 As a result evidence and testimony grow cold and prisoners are forced to look to the federal courts. A prisoner may choose to bring an action for injunctive relief under the federal Civil Rights Act. 48 While in such an action the prisoner need not first exhaust his state remedies, the courts might hesitate to grant injunctive relief, as a result of a fear that the threat of contempt proceedings would hamper prison administration. 49 Because of the difficulty in proving an intent to deprive the prisoner of his constitutional rights, relief through money damages is also severely limited. 50 The only other relief for the prisoner is the possibility of active federal prosecutions under the Civil Rights Act or state legislation to reform the prison system-both of which appear very remote.
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Thus it would seem that the prisoner has no adequate remedy in the demanding state to correct alleged abuses of his constitutional rights. Habeas corpus appears to be the most practical course, but the disadvantages of such an action remain unremedied.
The Supreme Court may not have entirely set aside the decision of the Third Circuit in the Dye ease. The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurther adds emphasis to a point brought out by the majority: It was urged that the fugitive had made no suggestion in his application that he would be without opportunity to resort to the courts of Alabama for protection upon his return.
5 2 This would appear to leave open the possibility that if Woodall had alleged in his application that he would be without such opportunity to resort to the state courts for protection, the Supreme Court would have heard the merits of the case. 53 It could then be argued that this constitutional protection would extend to future punishment so severe (upon his return) as to hinder or place an extremely high price on the prisoner's resort to the courts. Such a view is in accord with the dissent in the Dye case, which said that relief should only be granted where prospective mistreatment is alleged that would allow an application to the demanding state courts only at the risk of death or severe bodily harm. 54 Ross v. Middlebrooks, 55 and other cases 5 " recognized the need for a different rule from that of the Sweeney case where there is danger of future mistreatment or unavailability of state remedies.
More than mere allegations of future cruel and unusual punishment will be required in order to obtain a hearing upon the merits, since Woodall had alleged that much. Perhaps there must be an interrelation between the allegations of future cruel punishment and the resulting unavailability of the courts. But any future action will surely fail unless it is alleged that the courts of the demanding state are only open at the price of great bodily harm. 
